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EMMETT M. HALL: A PROFILEOF THE
JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT
By FREDERICK

VAUGHAN*

I suppose, too, it was partly the effect of sitting in court all day listening to cases.
One gets what you might call the judicial temper of mind. Pepperleigh had it so
strongly developed that I've seen him kick a hydrangea pot to pieces with his foot
because the accursed thing wouldn't flower. He once threw the canary cage clear
into the lilac bushes because the 'blasted bird wouldn't stop singing'. It was a
straight case of judicial temper. Lots of judges have it, developed in just the
same broad, all-round way as with Judge Pepperleigh.
Stephen Leacock,
Sunshine Sketches of a Little Town

A.

INTRODUCTION

It is a commonplace observation to say that some men or women make
better judges than others; everyone knows that some people display certain
characteristics which, when put together, constitute the judicial temperament.

And anyone who has spent anytime studying the work of judges knows that
there is no such thing as the judicial temperament

-

there are numerous

combinations of mind and disposition which conspire to make a 'good judge'.
Despite the absence of a single standard against which one can measure a
good judge, there are a number of characteristics which can be discerned in
those men who have served society well as judges. Such Canadians as Ivan

Cleveland Rand, Sir Lyman Poore Duff, John R. Cartwright, Chief Justice
Samuel Freedman of Manitoba, and Chief Justice Jules Deschenes of Quebec,
all qualify as men of outstanding judicial temperament. To this list must surely be added Emmett Matthew Hall.
What was the peculiar amalgam of characteristics which made Emmett
Hall a good judge? However partial my judgment shall appear, it is the product
of many hours of interviewing Emmett Hall and people who have known him
including men as divergent in their political views as John Diefenbaker
and T. C. Douglas.
With no pretence to order, I answer: an intelligent but not a philosophic
cast of mind. Despite his disposition to natural justice it carried no elaborately reasoned content in the manner of a Lord Denning. His is a practical wisdom anchored in a deeply held view of the human condition. He is also
compassionate and generous. Emmett Hall lives a life of concern for other
people - especially the poor, the ill and those caught in cultural destitution,

such as Canadian native peoples. His compassion is not merely an official or
public posture, for throughout his papers one finds letters addressed to "My
@Copyright, 1977, Frederick Vaughan.
* Frederick Vaughan is a Professor in the Department of Political Studies at the

University of Guelph and was a Visiting Fellow at Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University, during 1977.
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Anonymous Benefactor," which reveal the personal generosity which he never
discusses. His compassion has also made him a good listener - an indispensable quality for a good judge.
No one who saw Emmett Hall in court, either as a defence attorney or
as a judge, could deny that Emmett Hall knew the law and continued to study
it all his life. He was in every sense of the term a 'lawyer's judge' - one who
understood the problems involved in litigation and respected the efforts put
into arguing before court. In fact, even as a judge Emmett Hall continued to
see himself as a defence counsel, in the sense that he always carefully scrutinized lower court proceedings to ensure that the accused had received a fair
trial.
Hall's intelligence and strong social convictions gave him a degree of
independence or open-mindedness which few men can claim. He demonstrated this in no uncertain terms soon after ascending to the Supreme Court
of Canada. His first major judgment was a stinging dissent in Truscott. His
strongly held views gave him the appearance on occasion of being 'tough'
as indeed he was.
If there is one attribute which Emmett Hall possesses beyond any other,
it is his enormous energy or capacity for hard work. All his judgments reflect
an intensity of concentration and perception. He has accustomed himself over
many years to sustained hard work. Finally, a characteristic which has set
Hall apart all his life is his impatience. But his impatience was ever on behalf
of some social good and not for personal gain. Emmett Hall has never sought
power for its own sake, but has worked to obtain a position from which he
might influence the exercise of the power of others. This is, of course, a form
of power, but he has never used it in the interest of self-aggrandizement. He
sees public power as a trust which must be used as a means of assisting the
needy or less fortunate. This does not mean that Hall spurned public acknowledgement of his virtues or that he eschewed money. Far from it; he
enjoyed the perquisites which attend office or authority.
Despite his many virtues, Emmett Hall is not yet a fit subject for hagiography. One can do no better than to try to emulate James Boswell who
wrote in the introduction of his famous Life of Johnson that Dr. Johnson
will be seen as he really was, for I profess to write not his panegyric, which must
be all praise, but his life; which great and good as he was, must not be supposed
to be entirely perfect. To be as he was, is indeed subject of panegyric enough to
any man in this state of being; but in every picture, there should be shade as well
as light, and when I delineate him without reserve, I do what he himself recommended, both by his precept and his example.'

Emmett Hall will be portrayed as he really was, as far as that is possible for
a biographer who, unlike Boswell, did not know his subject intimately.
EARLY LIFE
Emmett Hall was born into a large devout Irish Catholic family on
November 9, 1898. Until he was twelve, the family lived on a dairy farm in
B.

I J.Boswell, The Life of Johnson (London: Oxford University Press, 1964) at 22.
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St. Columban, Quebec. During these early years, he became proficient in
French and developed a lasting affection for Quebec. In 1910, he moved to
Saskatoon and there advanced quickly through elementary and high school.
He entered the newly established College of Law at the University of Saskatchewan in 1916 at the age of eighteen where he became known as the
"boy" law student.
The fact that Emmett Hall became actively involved in litigation early
in his career as a student under A. E. Bench was to have a profound impact
on his temperament. It not only led him to prepare his cases with meticulous
care, but also to be especially suspicious of police tactics and to be a stickler
for legal procedures. It taught him, above all, that most cases had a 'villain'
at their centre; before a case could be won it was essential to find the 'villain'.
And Emmett Hall believed with a passion that the law says that an accused
person cannot be convicted where there is reasonable doubt. He was especially concerned that the little people got the benefit of his enormous energies on
their behalf and demanded as much from the state. Two cases in which Hall
acted as2 defence counsel illustrate these views: the first was the case of John
Petlock.
John Petlock had been charged with the murder of his brother Mike on
October 8, 1955. The details of the case were gruesome: someone had shot
and killed Mike Petlock, his wife, their two young children, and Mike's elderly mother. All signs pointed to John Petlock who had been at odds with his
brother Mike ever since the death of their father five years before.
At the trial Emmett Hall admitted that John shot his brother but argued
that it had been in self-defence. He viewed the case as a large jigsaw puzzle
which he and the jury had been called upon to assemble in the interest of
justice. However, some of the pieces seemed to be missing or distorted. He
began the defence by showing that the police, in constructing their theory,
had excluded certain fine details and overlooked various points. These missing pieces were highly relevant because some of them confirmed Hall's premise that there had been a fight after Mike Petlock had pointed a loaded rifle
at John. Hall focused his attention on the testimony of R.C.M.P. Sergeant
Minor who led the investigation at the Petlock farm and who composed the
main outlines of the prosecution theory implicating John Petlock. "What a
wonderful thing it would have been," Hall said to the jury, "if a photograph
had been taken before anything was moved. But no photograph was taken."
Slowly but steadily Hall began to cast doubt upon the manner in which the
police behaved in the course of collecting evidence against John Petlock. He
pointedly invited the jury to scrutinize the evidence and theory of the prosecution.
Sergeant Minor formed a theory as to what had happened, and gentlemen, it is
now of supreme importance that everything from here on - in terms of the
police evidence - be judged in the light of the theory that was formed; because
is this not the fact that in our own [your own] ways of life we proceed at
times from certain theories or standpoints? Is it not the way with us all as part
2This case was unreported. Quotes concerning this case have been taken from the
Hall papers which are in the possession of the author.
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of our human characteristics, that having formed an opinion, we release it very
slowly and we will stick to it - sometimes through thick and thin - regardless
of the fact that, to other people, it may sound silly.

Sergeant Minor had devised the theory that Mike had been killed in the
kitchen. Emmett Hall attempted to prove that Mike had been shot outside
and his body dragged into the kitchen after the fatal quarrel. "If Mike was
not killed in the kitchen, then where does all this evidence lead you? The
whole house of cards come crashing down, insofar as the police case is concerned."
Hall showed from the police photographs that Mike Petlock had been
dragged: "The pattern of the blood which flowed from Mike's body on to
the mat, on to the floor, fixes the pattern there; showing that that mat and
Mike reached that location at the same time." He then submitted that the
kitchen revealed no signs of struggle. Above all, Hall asked, if Mike had been
shot in the kitchen where were the empty casings? The police admitted that
they had looked for empty casings and had found none, but they had found
three empty casings outside the house near another body.
Hall built upon these points step by step in his effort to cast reasonable
doubt upon the police theory. He emphasized the fact that the police had
failed to explore a part of the backyard where he maintained that John and
Mike had struggled and that his assistant had been prevented from making a
search. But, he reminded the jury, the police themselves still persisted in
refusing to examine that part of the yard. "Why?" he asked repeatedly, and
postulated that it was "because it did not fit the preconceived theory of the
police and prosecution."
As the trial progressed and as Hall saw how loose the case against
Petlock was, his anger and impatience increased. Towards the end of his
lengthy address to the jury, Hall asked: 'Does it not appear to you, gentlemen, that Sergeant Minor is just a little too anxious? I am not suggesting,"
he continued, "that he would wilfully do anything to bring about the unlawful
conviction of a man, but don't some of us get a little too exuberant about our
work, and feel that our reputation may be at stake and feel that we must fall
up the gaps as we go along, lest it can be considered that the prosecution
failed by reason of something that he did not do." The 'villain' was Sergeant
Minor, or more precisely, the Sergeant's theory. Emmett Hall concluded his
defence of John Petlock with the following words:
My suggestion to you, gentlemen of the jury, is that this prosecution must fail

because the mistake that was made was the original mistake made by the prosecution of coming to a wrong theory and then closing the mind to anything else, and
everything since that day has been done to support that theory and what does not
fit in with that has to be discarded.

The jury deliberated for four hours and at length emerged with a verdict: John Petlock was guilty of the manslaughter of his brother Mike. Emmett Hall fumed with indignation as the judge sentenced Petlock to seventeen
and a half years in the federal penitentiary at Prince Albert. He was so sure
that he had won that he could not understand how the jury could have failed
to see the grounds for doubt which he had cast on the police evidence. He
has always retained that view, not because he had lost, but because he sin-
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cerely believed that the case against John Petlock was not sufficiently solid,
and that it was riddled with grounds for doubt.
If there is one thing that emerges from this case, it is Hall's unswerving
determination to bring to bear all his energy and passion for justice on any
case where he believed that there was a miscarriage of justice. He insisted
that the duty of the prosecution is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
an accused person is guilty; vague inference or circumstantial evidence is not
sufficient. He demanded hard facts and sound procedures. These were attitudes or convictions which he took to the bench and which help to explain his
belief in judicial activism to ensure a fair trial.
Hall was also concerned with protecting people from procedural abuses.
If the prosecution made a mistake in procedure, Emmett Hall pounced upon
it with tenacity. This is illustrated in the following case of In re Beck.8 Kaspar
Beck, a Russian immigrant, had settled in Saskatoon in 1910. By 1951 he
had acquired six and a quarter sections of prime Saskatchewan farmland.
He had paid cash for each new quarter section and his seventeen sons and
daughters worked on the farms for him. None of them was paid a salary but
they were all provided with food, clothing, housing, and a little spending
money. When one of the children married, the new bride or husband was
brought into the family and he or she received the same benevolent treatment
accorded to the sons and daughters. In short, Kaspar Beck ruled a small
fiefdom in the heart of Saskatchewan. None of the family complained or
resented the life style. Some of the local farmers complained about the "land
hog" but most of them were clearly jealous of Beck's efficient farm operation.
Beck lived easily with those complaints - if he even heard them. But in
1947, when the Department of National Revenue informed him that he had
failed to file income tax for the years 1941-45, that was a different matter.
He was assessed a fine of $100 for not filing his 1945 returns. As was his
custom with notices from governments, Kaspar Beck ignored it. This led the
Department of National Revenue to probe more deeply into his past. The
investigation resulted in the startling revelation that Kaspar Beck was delinquent in back taxes to the amount of $28,623. The Department served notice
on him and announced its intention to collect - even if this meant that Beck
had to sell part or all of his land. This announcement stunned Beck. He
simply could not understand how the government could take land away from
a man who had paid for each parcel and held clear title to it. It reminded
him of what had happened to his father's land in Russia in 1919 when the
new Soviet government had confiscated his property without compensation.
Beck was thrown into total confusion; he sought the aid of his eldest sons
who advised him to retain a lawyer at once. But Beck didn't trust anyone
outside of his family and as a result he went through several Saskatoon lawyers - all of whom gave up in exasperation. They could not make Beck
understand that he was obliged to pay his back taxes. Beck turned a deaf ear
to all suggestions and stubbornly refused to pay. When word reached him
that the Department of National Revenue had secured a court order to auction off as much of his property as necessary to defray the cost of the back
8

In re Beck (1951), 3 W.W.R. (N.S.) 92 (Sask. K.B.).
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taxes, Beck became hysterical and finally consented to accept his son's advice
to retain Emmett Hall as his counsel.
Hall, like others in Saskatoon, had followed the newspaper accounts of
the affair. He was particularly concerned by the angry letters to the editor in
which people openly expressed their hostility to this German-speaking immigrant who had avoided service against Germany in World War I and World
War II. The atmosphere was hostile and very bitter.
Emmett Hall gladly took the case and poured all his energy into it. He
studied every facet of the government's case against Beck and was at length
convinced that it was based on a valid legal argument. But to Hall, it did not
seem right that Beck should run the risk of losing everything which he had
worked so hard to obtain. He met with Beck and reassured him of his sympathy and determination to do his utmost on his behalf. But despite all his
efforts, he could not discover anything irregular in the procedures followed
by the Department.
The auction was held on October 24, 1950. Kaspar
had to be removed as he tearfully attempted to prevent
of his precious land. Shouting in German, he urged the
and frantically pleaded with the bidders, several of whom
tors, but to no avail.

Beck attended but
the piecemeal sale
auctioneer to stop
were land specula-

The land was sold for much less than its value and it soon became clear
that not one parcel of Becek's land would remain at the end of the auction.
That meant that the fifty-four members of Beck's family would be thrown off
the land on which they had worked for over forty years. At the end of the
auction all of Kaspar Becek's land was sold for a total of $22,100 - more
than $6,300 less than the amount of delinquent taxes. Beck was almost mad
with grief. But in the meantime Hall had continued to work on the case. He
discovered that the Department had not strictly complied with the procedures
set out by the Saskatchewan Executions Act.4 He informed Beck that there
was a good chance that the court might nullify the sales. Beck, barely acknowledging him, consented through his son to authorize Hall to go to court.
Hall argued three points before Justice Smith of the Court of Queen's
Bench: first, that the Department of National Revenue had failed to advertise
the property in accordance with the manner prescribed by The Executions Act
of Saskatchewan; second, that the lands were sold at a grossly inadequate
price; and third, that the southwest quarter of section 11 was not advertised
for sale at all. Hall described the auction as "a farce under the guise of law."
The Executions Act clearly required that the property be advertised in the
newspaper "nearest to the site of the property." His investigation revealed
that that had not been done.
Justice Smith accepted Hall's arguments and declared the sale of the
Beck lands invalid. Beck could not comprehend the details of the matter; all
he understood was that Emmett Hall had saved his lands. Armed with a
4 The Executions Act, R.S.S. 1930, c. 65, s. 20.

312

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

(VOL. 15,

No. 2

power of attorney, Hall returned to Saskatoon to oversee the return of Beck's
lands and the payment of his back taxes.
A month after the trial, Kaspar Beck was at home looking over his land
when he saw two well-dressed men approach the house. Thinking that they
were another delegation from the Revenue Department, he ran to the cellar
crying "they'll never leave me alone." Mrs. Beck admitted the two men and
discovered that they were not from the Revenue Department but were representatives of an oil company offering to buy up drilling rights on farm land
throughout Saskatchewan. Most farmers considered the terms of the agreement reasonable and the compensation generous. Mrs. Beck went to fetch her
husband from the cellar and found him bathed in blood from self-inflicted
wounds. Kaspar Beck had attempted suicide by striking himself on the head
with an axe.
When Beck finally came upstairs, he explained that he had fallen and cut
his head. He listened in a daze to the two men and, uncharacteristically, consented to sign the drilling agreement. After they had left Beck flew into a
rage: "They tricked me into selling my land. They have tricked me," he
fumed. Kaspar Beck was by this point totally exhausted and could not be
calmed. He spent most of the night in a chair brooding over the loss of his
lands. Katherine left him late in the night and went to bed. The next morning
Kaspar was not there; she called to him but there was no answer. She went
out into the garage, and found her husband - hanging by a rope from a
rafter.
Kaspar Beck never knew that the Department of National Revenue had
decided not to appeal the ruling of Justice Smith, nor did he ever know that
Emmett Hall had managed to settle the intestacy by giving one third of the
land to Katherine and two thirds to his children: thus the land which Kaspar
Beck had worked so hard to acquire was passed on to his family. To this day,
Hall counts this as one of his greatest achievements as a practising attorney.
C.

CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SASKATCHEWAN COURT OF
QUEEN'S BENCH

Hall was appointed Chief Justice of the Court of Queen's Bench upon
the retirement of Chief Justice J. T. Brown and took the Oath of Office and
the Oath of Allegiance on October 5, 1957. He willingly relinquished his
successful - and lucrative - law practice for a judicial appointment because
it provided him with greater scope for public service. He never viewed appointment to the bench as a comfortable way to end a distinguished career.
Instead, he saw it as a platform from which he could initiate needed reforms
and serve the cause of justice more effectively.
The duties and responsibilities of the Chief Justice of the Saskatchewan
Court of Queen's Bench are onerous. Not only is he charged with the responsibility of administering the rules relating to pleadings, practise, and procedures of the Court, but also, with superintending the district Courts of the
province. He must see to it that the Queen's Bench sittings are properly
scheduled - that judges are available and that there is no undue backlog of
cases awaiting trial. In short, the position entails time-consuming administra-
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tive responsibilities. Few men have put as much energy into the detailed
aspects of their work as Hall did into his. Along with Mr. Justice McKercher
and Harold Thompson, he set about revising the Rules of Court and finished
this in December, 1960. He also undertook to revise the Crown Practice
Rules. One of his first administrative decisions was to review the tariff of fees
paid to lawyers appearing before the court. It had not been revised for years
and was far below the fees in neighbouring provinces. Chief Justice Hall
increased it by 30% and did away with the requirement that lawyers submit
detailed bills of costs; in their stead, he adopted the Alberta practice of requiring a simple bill of a consolidated amount. But Hall's administrative
duties did not prevent him from becoming deeply involved with court work,
as the following review of some of his decisions reveals.
He was particularly sensitive to novel dimensions in criminal cases. In
the fall of 1958 he was confronted with a voir dire which raised an important
question concerning the admissibility of a confession.5 The police had arrested John Hnedish on suspicion of having committed a crime, claiming
that when they entered his room at 6:00 a.m., he was fully awake. They then
took him to an interrogation room where they questioned him at length and
had him sign a statement. When the Crown Attorney introduced this confession, Hnedish's counsel, P. G. Makaroff - with whom the young Emmett
Hall had defended the Regina rioters in 1935 - objected, claiming that
Hnedish had been asleep at the time and remained under the influence of
sleep during the interrogation. In other words, he was drowsy and had unknowingly signed an incriminating statement.
According to English jurisprudence, evidence may be admitted in court
as long as it is judged to be true - even if it has been illegally obtained. 6
The United States Supreme Court, on the other hand, has ruled that illegally
obtained evidence is inadmissible.7 Hall personally felt that the American
view should prevail but was bound by Anglo-Canadian precedents. He
predicted that, "when the point comes squarely to be decided, another court
will take a hard look at the whole question, including the implications above
mentioned and others."8 Little did he suspect that he would play a major role
as a member of the Supreme Court of Canada in attempting to resolve the
practise of admitting illegally obtained evidence.
However, even in Hnedish, Hall was able to avoid applying the major
English precedent of R. v. Hammond.9 Since he felt that "much of Humphreys
J.'s judgment in the Hammond case is obiter dicta,"10 he was able to conclude
that "I am left with the conviction that because its foundation is on so inseGR. v. Hnedish (1958), 26 W.W.R. 685; 29 C.R. 347 (Sask. Q.B.).
6
R. v. Hammond, [1941] 3 All E.R. 318; 28 Cr. App. R. 84 (C.C.A.).
7 Chambersv. Florida,309 U.S. 227 (1940); McNabb v. U.S., 318 U.S. 332 (1943);
Mallory v. U.S., 354 U.S. 449 (1957); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964);
Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8
Hnedish, supra, note 5 at 688 (W.W.R.).
9Hammond, supra, note 6.
10 Hnedish, supra, note 5 at 688 (W.W.R.).
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cure a footing as the obiter dicta of Hammond's case, I cannot follow it or
accept it as good law in Saskatchewan.""
As one might suspect, Emmett Hall was at his best in criminal cases in
which he revealed his capacity for scrutinizing trial and police procedures.
In R. v. Phillips,'2 the accused had been tried before a Justice of the Peace
on a charge of impaired driving. Phillips was without a lawyer and refused
to plead guilty. He was convicted of violating s. 223 of the Criminal Code,
fined $50 plus $23.90 court costs, and was given until December 31 to pay.
He paid the fine on December 30, 1957.
Two months later, Phillips retained counsel and appealed to the Court
of Queen's Bench, claiming that the original conviction was invalid because
the indictment had not disclosed the nature of the offence and the Justice
of the Peace had lacked jurisdiction to try the case. Crown Counsel countered
that s. 682 of the Criminal Code prevents an appeal by way of certiorariin
such cases.
However, Chief Justice Hall noted that the Criminal Code required that
the charge in the Phillips case be in writing and under oath and that, in the
case of two or more charges, they be set out in separate counts and disposed
of in turn. Phillips had been charged on two counts but was tried as if there
was only one. Hall concluded that: "It follows therefore that the information
was bad in law and also the conviction."' 3 As to whether the Criminal Code
prevented him from reviewing the case, he asked: "Does it follow that by
reason of section 682 of the Criminal Code this court is powerless to act?
In my opinion, section 682 is not a bar where the proceedings are invalid
ab initio."'14 Hall had ordered the records from the court at Kerrobert prior
to giving his judgment - and he found what he had suspected: a shoddy
trial. That was all he needed; he had clear jurisdiction to scrutinize the validity of proceedings of the inferior court - and they were found wanting.
In hearing appeals from inferior courts, Emmett Hall treated lower court
judges fairly but he demanded that they preside over a fair and impartial court.
On one occasion in 1959, Chief Justice Hall was called upon to review the
words of a Regina Police Magistrate who was accused of having uttered comments from the bench which were prejudicial to the accused. The Magistrate
was also charged with bias because of having imposed an excessive amount
as bail. Counsel for the accused appealed to the Court of Queen's Bench for
a writ to prohibit the Magistrate from presiding over the case. 1
When the case came before Chief Justice Hall, he reviewed the transcript
and listened to the testimony of a newspaper reporter and of the Police
Magistrate himself. It was confirmed that the Magistrate said that "while this
11Id.
12R.v. Phillips (1958), 26 W.W.R. 315; 122 C.C.C. 181 (Sask. Q.B.).
13 Id. at 318 (W.W.R.).
14 Id.
15Re Elliott; R. v. Jackson

C.R. 368 (Sask. Q.B.).

(No. 2) (1959), 29 W.W.R. 579; 125 C.C.C. 354; 31
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accused may be as innocent as the driven snow, nevertheless I know from my
own experience that some of this security salesman stuff has been a terrible
racket in this province. This has been a serious problem and should be
cleaned up."' It was further established that the Magistrate and counsel for
the accused had exchanged words in anger. The Chief Justice summed up his
views gently but firmly:
I have studied these transcripts and with regret I must say that they indicate a
departure from that essential quality of impartial detachment which should be
the hallmark of every judge or magistrate in respect of every cause that comes
before a court. I do not suggest that the learned magistrate was being consciously
biased or prejudiced but he permitted himself to be misled into fixing excessive
bail by the representations made to him by counsel for the Crown and by linking
Jackson's [the accused] arrest and the charges against him with the numerous arrests of stock salesmen a few days before and by his personal experience as to
'this security salesman stuff being a terrible racket in this' province'. 17
This case prompted Emmett Hall to state clearly his basic judicial credo
one which he himself followed faithfully: "Every accused has an inherent
and constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial court and that means a
court without any preconceived notions or ideas respecting the necessity of
suppressing certain types of offences as distinct from others. I do not think
that this is a right which can be waived because it is one which goes to the
root of the proper administration of justice". 18 Hall accordingly granted the
application to prohibit the Police Magistrate from presiding at the preliminary
hearings on the three remaining charges against Jackson.
Emmett Hall has always been known for protecting the rights of the
accused and ensuring that police procedures were followed meticulously. This
was no less true for accused persons who happened to be lawyers. On October 4, 1960, the Regina police obtained two warrants to search the office and
residence of Morris C. Shumiatcher, a Regina lawyer, on suspicion of having
committed an offence. 19 Counsel for Shumiatcher, A. W. Embury and E. J.
Moss, argued that the warrants were improperly granted and urged that they
be quashed. Chief Justice Hall agreed that the Magistrate who issued the
warrants did not have judicial cause to do so and that the warrants were too
vague since they "left to the discretion of those executing the warrants as to
20
what should be seized."
It became evident to the police that the court was going to quash the
search warrants so they applied to another Magistrate, L. F. Bence, for two
more. Magistrate Bence issued the warrants and all the parties were back in
court the next day!21 One can sense in his judgment Hall's anger at this
second attempt to ransack Shumiatcher's office. He found even more cause
'Old. at 582 (W.W.R.).
17

Id.

18 Id. at 583 (W.W.R.).
19 Shumiatcher v. Attorney-General of Saskatchewan (1960), 33 W.W.R. 132; 129
C.C.C. 267; 34 C.R. 152 (Sask. Q.B.).
20 Id. at 133 (W.W.R.).
21

Shumiatcher v. Attorney-General of Saskatchewan (1960), 33 W.W.R. 134; 129
C.C.C. 270; 34 C.R. 154 (Sask. Q.B.).
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to quash these warrants since the Magistrate could not possibly have had
judicial reason to grant them since the first two warrants were technically in
effect at the time the Magistrate granted the second pair. As Hall stated:
In my view the new warrants cover a broader field than the first warrants and
are even more open to objection.... I can hardly conceive that in a law office
such as that of Shumiatcher, Moss and Lavery, in which no suggestion of wrongdoing has been suggested against the partners Moss and Lavery or against Mr.
Shumiatcher, it would be possible for a peace officer executing the warrant to
know just what to seize. I do not think it was ever contemplated by parliament
that under the search warrant authorized by section 429 of the Criminal Code,
1953-54, ch. 51, those executing the warrant would have carte blanche to open
and to read the private papers of clients and of partners in the hope of finding
something therein that might in the sole judgment of those searching
have evi22
dentiary value relevant to the charges made against Shumiatcher.

The second set of search warrants was accordingly quashed.
But that did not end the case of Shumiatcher v. The Attorney General
of Saskatchewan. Nor was it the last time that Emmett Hall heard charges
against Morris Shumiatcher. But unlike the two earlier cases involving
Shumiatcher which came before Emmett Hall as Chief Justice of the Court of
Queen's Bench, the third one came before him when he was Chief Justice
2
of Saskatchewan, after his appointment to that position on March 3, 19 61. 8
Morris C. Shumiatcher and two associates, Walter W. Luboff of Saskatoon
and Thomas S. C. Fawcett of Ottawa, were charged under the Criminal Code
with unlawfully conspiring to commit an indictable offence, namely: "unlawfully by deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means, to defraud the public
of property, money or valuable securities." 24 The Court scrutinized the indictment against Shumiatcher and found that it was not sufficiently detailed
to comply with the Criminal Code which requires that:
A count shall contain sufficient detail of the circumstances of the alleged offence
to give to the accused reasonable information ... and to identify the transaction
referred to.25

Chief Justice Hall, agreeing with Justice Culliton, stated:
No reason was given why the crown elected to convey as little detail in the information [indictment] as was done here. And when the information was challenged as being invalid, the crown could easily at that time have laid a new information giving the detail lacking in the first information, but instead it has
chosen to stand firm and to insist on proceeding on an information that appears
to have been studiously
prepared to give, at best, the minimum of detail to the
person accused.26

This was unacceptable to Emmett Hall since "an accused person should be
able to tell from the information or indictment the precise nature of the
charge against him. That principle has been carried into the Canadian Bill
137 (W.W.R.).
Shumiatcher v. Attorney-General of Saskatchewan (1962), 39 W.W.R. 577; 133
C.C.C. 69 (Sask. CA.).
24
1d. at 579 (W.W.R.), paraphrasing R.S.C. 1953-54, c. 51, s.323 (1).
25
R.S.C. 1953-54, c. 51, s. 492(3).
26Shumiatcher, supra, note 23 at 578 (W.W.R.).
22Id. at
23
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of Rights. '2 7 Chief Justice Hall let it be known on that occasion that he
considered the new CanadianBill of Rights to place a special responsibility
upon the police and the judiciary. "The prosecution, acting in the name of the
sovereign, is, in my opinion, under a specific duty not to circumvent or negative this positive injunction of the parliament of Canada. The courts, too,
must be vigilant in seeing that the provisions28of the Canadian Bill of Rights
are not breached, ignored or whittled away."
As mentioned previously, Emmett Hall's Saskatchewan court decisions
reveal his independence of judgment. This was nowhere more readily apparent than in Thomas v. Thomas,2 9 which Hall heard in September, 1961. That
case was an appeal from a judgment of Mr. Justice McKercher of the Court
of Queen's Bench refusing the application of Mrs. Thomas to have the farm
and chattel mortgages sold and the sum divided equally between the parties
under The PartnershipAct.30
When the case came before Chief Justice Hall, he, along with Mr. Justice McNiven and Mr. Justice Culliton, ruled that since the beginning of the
marriage on November 2, 1952 until its dissolution seven years later on October 2, 1959, both parties contributed equal amounts of money toward the
purchase of seven quarters of land and the necessary farm equipment. Mr.
Thomas argued that the relationship had not been a partnership and that his
former wife had no claim to direct a sale and division of the assets. He had
been successful with this line of argument before Justice McKercher.
After hearing the facts, the court concluded that Mrs. Thomas had
established that the marriage included a de facto and de jure partnership
arrangement and, therefore, fell under the provisions of the Saskatchewan
PartnershipAct. "In my view," said the Chief Justice, "the learned trial judge
should have allowed ...that the joint undertaking constituted a partnership

and that the plaintiff [Mrs. Thomas] was entitled to seek the relief provided
by The PartnershipAct."3 1
Chief Justice Hall further reasoned that when Mrs. Thomas advised her
husband that she did not intend to return, she served effective notice which
dissolved the partnership - as required under the terms of The Partnership
Act. The Chief Justice said in his conclusion:
As the plaintiff has established that the farming operations were a partnership and
that this partnership has been dissolved, the appeal will be allowed. The matter
will be referred back to the Court of Queen's Bench for the necessary directions
to wind up the partnership in accordance with the provisions of The Partnership
Act. While I feel compelled to make this order, I strongly urge the plaintiff and
defendant to use every effort to settle their business difficulties by agreement. It
appears to me that in respect to their partnership undertaking, there is no real
difference between the parties and there should be no obstacle to a mutually
satisfactory settlement. If the parties fail to heed this suggestion, and the court is
27 Id.
28

(W.W.R.).
Id.at 599 (W.W.R.).

29

Thomas v. Thomas (1961), 29 D.L.R. (2d) 576; 36 W.W.R. 23 (Sask. C.A.).

o The Partnership Act, R.S.S., 1953, c. 352.

31 Thomas, supra, note 29 at 578 (D.L.R.); 26 (W.W.R.).
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compelled to direct a sale of the assets,
there is every likelihood that both parties
32
will end up with little or nothing

Emmett Hall was no longer on the Supreme Court of Canada when the celebrated Murdoch33 case came before the Court. However, there is no doubt
that he would have stood foresquare with Chief Justice Bora Laskin in affirming the need to revise the common law conception of the marriage contract
in those circumstances where the wife has contributed manually and materially to the farming enterprise.
D.

THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA

Emmett Hall was sworn in as a puisne judge of the Supreme Court of
Canada on January 10, 1963 - thirty-five years after he had first appeared
before the Supreme Court as a young attorney. He manifested his customary
intelligent independence and impatience soon after ascending to the bench in
the celebrated Truscott case.3 4 Hall was the lone dissenter in that reference
and his judgment was a sharp rejection of the court majority decision. He did
not mince words for he had studied the trial transcript meticulously and
found two villains: the Crown Attorney and the trial judge. The proceedings
amounted to an unfair trial in Hall's mind: "I take the view that the trial was
not conducted according to law. Even the guiltiest criminal must be tried
according to law. ' 3 5 Justice Hall found that there were grave errors in the
trial primarily as a result of "Crown Counsel's method in trying to establish
guilt and by the learned Trial Judge's failure to appreciate that the course
being followed by the Crown would necessarily involve the jury being led
away from the objective appraisal by the evidence for and against the prisoner."36 The original conviction was the product of a bad trial and, as Hall
insisted, "A 37
bad trial remains a bad trial. The only remedy for a bad trial is
a new trial.
The Truscott case is important for an understanding of Emmett Hall's
judicial temperament because it contains a clear summary of how he saw his
role as a Supreme Court Justice: he viewed himself as a defence counsel who
was charged with the responsibility of bringing all his energies of mind and
body to bear upon the case at bar to see whether the accused or convicted
person had received a fair trial. Hall was most interested in criminal cases
because that was the area of the law with which he was most familiar, and
he showed little patience with his brother judges for not seeing the flaws in
the Truscott case.
If one had to identify a Supreme Court case which caused as much internal discord among members of the Court as Truscott, it would be R. v.
s2Jd. at 580 (D.L.R.); 28 (W.W.R.).
33
Murdoch v. Murdoch, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 423; 41 D.L.R. (3d) 367; 13 R.F.L. 185.
341n the Matter of a Reference Re: Steven Murray Truscott, [1967] S.C.R. 309;
62 D.L.R. (2d) 545; [1967] 2 C.C.C. 285; 1 C.R.N.S. 1.
3
Sld. at 383 (S.C.R.); 611 (D.L.R.).
3
61d. at 384 (S.C.R.); 611-12 (D.L.R.).
3
7id. at 390 (S.C.R.); 616 (D.L.R.).
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Wray.38 In that case Hall found himself in dissent along with Chief Justice
Cartwright and Justice Spence. John Wray was tried on a charge of noncapital murder in 1968. The police had arrested him in the morning and prevented him from talking with his lawyer. They admitted that they had done
so because they feared that the lawyer would instruct the accused not to tell
them where he had put the murder weapon. After lengthy and continuous
questioning, Wray signed a statement and told the police where he had
thrown the rifle. When the Crown Attorney attempted to adduce evidence
as to the part taken by Wray in the finding of the murder weapon, the trial
judge refused to allow him to do so on the ground that since the testimony
was not voluntary the evidence was inadmissible.
The case went to the Ontario Court of Appeal where a unanimous court
upheld the right of the trial judge to exercise discretion in admitting evidence
which he felt would be unjust or unfair to the accused or calculated to bring
the administration of justice into disrepute. Mr. Justice Alyesworth said that
the information was "procured by trickery, duress and improper inducements
and [it was] clearly inadmissible.1 39 The Crown appealed this judgment to
the Supreme Court of Canada, arguing that the discretion of a trial judge did
not extend that far.
A full Court heard the appeal on January 29 and 30, 1970, and handed
down its judgment reversing the Ontario Court of Appeal on June 26, 1970.
The majority judgment was written by Mr. Justice Martland, who stated that
a trial judge has no general discretion to exclude admissible evidence because, in his opinion, its admission would be unjust or unfair to the accused.
He reasoned that a trial judge's discretion to exclude admissible evidence
does not extend beyond his duty to ensure that the minds of the jury will not
be prejudiced by evidence of little probative value, but of greater prejudicial
effect.
Mr. Justice Judson claimed in a separate judgment that in his mind,
"there is no justification for recognizing the existence of this discretion in
these circumstances. This type of evidence has been admissible for almost
200 years. There is no judicial discretion permitting the exclusion of relevant
evidence, in this case highly relevant evidence, on the ground of unfairness
to the accused. ... If this law is to be changed, a simple amendment to the
Canada Evidence Act would be sufficient. ....
,40 It would be difficult to find
views on the judicial function and the admissibility of evidence more at variance with those espoused by Emmett Hall.
Justice Hall accordingly dissented along with Chief Justice Cartwright,
who wrote the major dissenting opinion. Cartwright C.J.C. claimed that the
"great weight of authority indicates that the underlying reason for the rule
that an involuntary confession shall not be admitted is the supposed danger
38 R. v. Wray, [1971] S.C.R. 272; 11 D.L.R. (3d) 673; [1970] 4 C.C.C. 1; 11
C.R.N.S. 235.
39
R. v. Wray, [1970] 2 O.R. 3 at 5; [1970] 3 C.C.C. 122 at 123; 9 C.R.N.S. 131

at 133 (Ont. C.A.).

40 Wra,, supra, note 38 at 299 (S.C.R.); 694 (D.L.R.).
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that it may be untrue." 41 What made judicial activism in the exercise of discretion imperative in this case for both Hall J. and Cartwright C.J.C. was that
the discretionary rule was not created by statute but by judges: Hall stated
that "Surely the established rule is that if the discretion has been judicially
exercised by the trial judge, it is not subject to review or to being weighed on
42
appeal.1
There can be no doubt that many observers felt Hall bent over backwards to be fair to the accused. Some even thought that he occasionally went
too far, as in The Queen v. Whitfield.4 3 This case involved the definition of
"lawful custody." A Toronto police officer had recognized James Whitfield,
who was wanted by the police, in a car at the intersection of St. Clair Avenue
and Dufferin Street. The officer touched him on the shoulder and told him
that he was under arrest - Whitfield responded by stepping on the accelerator. He was arrested some time later and eventually convicted of escaping
lawful custody. The Ontario Court of Appeal quashed the conviction on the
grounds that he had never been "custodially arrested."
The Supreme Court of Canada, with Hall and Spence JJ. dissenting,
restored the trial verdict. The majority argued that it has long been held
sufficient for a police officer to touch an accused person and announce that
he is under arrest. Hall J. disagreed with this reasoning, claiming that it was
an outdated civil law rule. He dismissed the British precedents, upon which
the majority rested its judgment, with the claim that "[ihe dead hand of the
past cannot reach that far. These outdated procedures evolved before the organization of police forces as we now know them and had no relation to the
44
arrest or taking into custody of a person charged with a criminal offence. "
However unpalatable this approach may be to some, it shows how Justice
Hall viewed his role on the court. He was often heard to say, mainly in
exasperation at the obstinacy of his brother judges, that the Supreme Court
of Canada is "a Court of justice as well as law."
As one who was eminently qualified in criminal practice, Emmett Hall
held strong views on other areas of criminal procedure. As we saw earlier,
he was convinced that the courts would soon have to tighten up the practice
governing the admission of evidence. Small wonder that he relished the
opportunity presented by Pichi v. The Queen.45 Writing for the Court, Hall
stated that the time had come for the Supreme Court to clear up the confusion surrounding exculpatory and inculpatory statements in evidence; indeed,
he claimed that the Court had an obligation to the lower courts to do so:
In my view the time is opportune for this Court to say that the admission in evidence of all Statements made by an accused to persons in authority, whether
inculpatory or exculpatory, is governed by the same rule and thus put to an end
41

Id. at 279 (S.C.R.); 679 (D.L.R.).
42d. at 303 (S.C.R.); 698 (D.L.R.).
43
R. v.Whitfield, [1970] S.C.R. 46; 7 D.L.R. (3d) 97.
44Id. at 53 (S.C.R.); 102 (D.L.R.).
45
Pichi v. The Queen, [1971] S.C.R. 23; 11 D.L.R. (3d) 700; 74 W.W.R. 674;
[1970] 4 C.C.C. 27; 12 C.R.N.S. 222.
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the continuing controversy and necessary evaluation by trial judges of every such

statement which the Crown proposes to4 6use in chief or on cross-examination as
either being inculpatory or exculpatory.

After reviewing the relevant precedents, Justice Hall concluded that there "is
no distinction to be drawn between inculpatory and exculpatory statements

as such in so far as their admissibility in evidence when tendered by the

Crown. '47 If the statement was given voluntarily, it could be admitted in
evidence; but if it was found to be involuntary, then it should not be admitted.

As one might expect in view of Hall's background in private practice,
he was particularly sensitive to problems involving evidence in criminal cases.
He felt obliged to solve evidentiary problems which had been created by prior
cases. In Ares v. Venner,48 Justice Hall wrote for a unanimous five-man court
that the Court ought to restate the hearsay rule. After acknowledging that
there were two schools of thought among judges - one which claimed that
it was the proper duty of the legislature to make such a clarifying restatement
and the other which said that it was the responsibility of the Court to do so
Justice Hall decided in favour of the latter school. He found support for
this approach in the Privy Council decision of Myers v. The Director of Public Prosecutions.49 "Although the views of Lords Donovan and Pearce are
those of the minority in Myers, I am of the opinion that this Court should
adopt and follow the minority view rather than resort to saying in effect:
'This judge-made law needs to be restated to meet modem conditions but we
must leave it to Parliament and the ten provincial legislatures to do the
job.' , In Hall's opinion, the inconsistencies of judge-made laws should be
rectified by judges; otherwise they would be in default of their judicial responsibilities.
E.

HALL AND NATIVE RIGHTS

Emmett Hall championed the cause of Canadian native peoples -

on

and off the bench - for many years and he welcomed the opportunity to do
8
something about it when he became a judge. In the Daniels ' case, he wrote:

"the lamentable history of Canada's dealings with Indians in disregard of
treaties made with them as spelt out in the judgment of Johnson J.A. in

Regina v. Sikyea ... ought in justice to allow the Indians to get the benefit
of an unambiguous law which for once appears to give them what the treaties
'52
and Commissioners who were sent to negotiate those treaties promised.
He strongly believed that "we as a nation, have failed our Indians and Metis." 53
46ld.

at 36 (S.C.R.); 709-10 (D.L.R.).

47ld. at 40 (S.C.R.); 712 (D.L.R.).
48

Ares v. Venner, [1970] S.C.R. 608; 14 D.L.R. (3d) 4.
49 Myers v. The D.P.P., [1965] A.C. 1001; [1964] All E.R. 881.
GOAres, supra, note 48 at 625-26 (S.C.R.); 16 (D.L.R.).
51 Danielsv. White and the Queen, [1968] S.C.R. 517; 2 D.L.R. (3d) 1; 64 W.W.R.
385; 4 C.R.N.S. 176.
521d. at 531 (S.C.R.); 13-14 (D.L.R.).
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This concern permeated his non-judicial writings as well, as one sees from a
reading of the recommendations on health services 4 or the Hall-Dennis
Report 55 on education.
Hall's angry impatience with the law and his concern for Canadian
native rights converged in two major cases: Calder v. Attorney-General of
British Columbia56 and Attorney-General of Canadav. Lavell. 7 Frank Calder,
along with other members of the Nishga Tribal Council and four Indian
bands in British Columbia, brought an action against the Attorney-General
of British Columbia, claiming that the aboriginal title to their tribal territory - consisting of 1,000 square miles in and around the Nasa River Valley
in northwestern British Columbia - had never been lawfully extinguished.
The Indian claim was dismissed at trial and the British Columbia Court
of Appeal rejected the appeal. The case came with leave to the Supreme
Court of Canada in the fall of 1971 and the judgment was handed down on
January 31, 1973, dismissing the appeal. The majority judgment was written
by Mr. Justice Judson, and Hall, Spence and Laskin JJ. dissented.
The Nishga Indians argued that their claim to the property in question
arose out of aboriginal occupation and that recognition of such a right is well
established in English law. Furthermore, they contended that no treaty or
contract with the Crown or the Hudson's Bay Company had ever been entered
into with respect to the area by anyone on behalf of the Nishga Nation. Within the area there are a number of reserves but they comprise only a small
part of the total band and the Nishga Nation had not agreed to or accepted
the creation of these reserves. The Nishga Indians further argued that they
held title to the lands under the Royal Proclamation of 1763 which extend
protection to all Indians living under the sovereignty of the British Crown.
The Proclamation stated:
And whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to our Interest, and the
Security of our Colonies, that the several Nations or Tribes of Indians with whom

We are connected, and who live under our Protection, should not be molested

or disturbed in the Possession of such Parts of our Dominions and Territories as,
by Us, are reserved to them, or any of
not having been ceded to or purchased
58
them, as their Hunting Grounds.

Judson J. ruled on the basis of St. CatharinesMilling and Lumber Co.
v. The Queen59 that "the Crown had at all times a present proprietary estate,
which title, after confederation, was in the Province, by virtue of s. 109 of the
54 (Can.) Royal Commission on Health Services (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 196465, 2 vol.).
55 (Ont.) Provincial Committee on Aims and Objectives of Education in the
Schools of Ontario. Living and Learning (Toronto: Newton Pub., 1968).
5 Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313; 34 D,L.R.
(3d) 145. The text of the case in the D.L.R. differs slightly from that of the S.C.R.
57
Attorney-General of Canada v. Lavell; Isaac v. Bedard, [1974] S.C.R. 1349; 38
D.L.R. (3d) 481.
58 Calder, supra, note 56 at 323 (S.C.R.); paraphrased at 153 (D.L.R.).
59 St. CatharinesMilling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1885), 10 O.R. 196, afl'd
(1887), 13 S.C.R. 577, aff'd (1888), 14 A.C. 46.
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B.N.A. Act. The Indian title was a mere burden upon that title which, following the cession of the lands under the treaty, was extinguished." 6 Judson J.
reasoned that "the Nishga bands represented by the appellants were not any
of the several nations or tribes of Indians who lived under British protection
and were outside the scope of the Proclamation." 61 The territory now comprising British Columbia did not come under British Sovereignty until the
Treaty of Oregon in 1846. When the Colony of British Columbia was established in 1858, the Nishga territory became part of it. It entered into confederation in 1871, bringing with it all the territory, including the Nishga
lands. On the basis of the St. CatharinesMilling judgment Judson J. ruled
that the Proclamation of 1763 was no longer binding once British Columbia
entered confederation in 1871.
Judson had more difficulty in disposing of the Indian claim to title by
virtue of their having occupied the territory for centuries. He not only acknowledged the fact of occupancy but that it was the basis of their claim to ownership. 62 The British Columbia courts ruled that this right or title had been
lawfully extinguished when British Columbia set apart reserves for Indians
upon entry into Confederation. Indeed, title was extinguished before Confederation. Judson J. showed that the Indian territories had been specifically
dealt with and acquired by the Crown in 1858 and 1861. He concluded that
"the sovereign authority elected to exercise complete dominion over the lands
in question adverse to any right of occupancy which the Nishga Tribe might
have had, when, by legislation, it opened up such lands for
settlement, subject
'63
to the reserves of land set aside for Indian occupation.
Justice Hall responded in a lengthy dissent, in which Spence and Laskin
JJ. concurred, that the Nishga Indians did have title to the lands in question
and that it had never been extinguished as the Court majority claimed. He
began by carefully stating the main issues before the court and then showing
how an error or oversight had led to the lower court judgment. That court
had mistakenly assigned the burden of proof to the Nishga Indians. There
was no doubt in Hall's mind that the evidence supported the claim that the
Indians possessed the lands in question; it was thus the Crown's responsibility
to show that this ownership had been validly extinguished. He then pointed
out that, unlike most other Indian tribes throughout Canada, the Nishga
Indians never entered into a treaty or deed of surrender with anyone; nor had
they ever been conquered.
Hall J.'s judgment contains long citations from the trial court transcript;
this was done to show that the trial judge's efforts to relate the Nishga concept of ownership of real property to the conventional common law elements
of ownership were inhibited by "a preoccupation with the traditional indicia
of ownership."' He noted that Lord Haldane had cautioned against just such
a problem many years earlier.
60 Calder, supra, note 56 at 320 (S.C.R.); 150-51 (D.L.R.).

61 Id. at
62 Id.at
63
1d. at
04 Id. at

325
328
344
372

(S.C.R.);
(S.C.R.);
(S.C.R.);
(S.C.R.);

153-54 (D.L.R.).
156 (D.L.R.).
167 (D.L.R.).
187 (D.L.R.).
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Hall's careful analysis of the trial transcript is apparent; he was approaching the problem as a defence attorney would, probing for inconsistencies and
oversights in the interest of ensuring that the Nishga Indians were treated
fairly. He felt that the trial judge had "overlooked that possession is of itself
proof of ownership. Primafacie, therefore, the Nishgas are the owners of the
lands that have been in their possession from time immemorial and, therefore, the burden of establishing that their right has been extinguished rests
squarely on the respondent." 65
Hall J. showed that treaties had been made with Indians in British Columbia and the Northwest Territories after Confederation. Treaty No. 8, for example, was made in 1889. From this he postulated: "Surely the Canadian
treaties, made with much solemnity on behalf of the Crown, were intended
to extinguish the Indian title. What other purpose did they serve?""0 He
further claimed that the Proclamation of 1763 served as a Magna Carta for
Indians. "The Proclamation, he said, "must be regarded as a fundamental
document upon which any just determination of original rights rests."0 7 That
Proclamation was pertinent to the case and had never been directly dealt with
by the Supreme Court of Canada.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal had been divided in its views on
the matter. The main British Columbia precedent was R. v. White and Bob.08
In that decision the majority stated that the Proclamation did not apply to
Vancouver Island, while Mr. Justice Norris claimed that it did: "The Royal
proclamation of 1763 was declatory and confirmatory of the aboriginal rights
and applied to Vancouver Island."6 9 The trial judge in the Calder case had
adopted the majority view in White and Bob. However, Hall felt that this
opinion "was based on incomplete research as to the state of knowledge of
the existence of the land mass between the Rocky Mountains and the Pacific
Ocean in 1763." 70 This led him to an extensive review of the history of that
part of British Columbia as well as a close scrutiny of the Proclamation. He
concluded at length that it "cannot be challenged that while the west coast
lands were mostly unexplored as of 1763 they were certainly known to exist
and that fact is borne out by the wording of the paragraph in the Proclamation previously quoted. 71
These steps were merely a prelude to the next important question:
"Were the rights either at common law or under the Proclamation extinguished? ' 7 2 Hall insisted that once aboriginal title was established, it must
then be proved that it was lawfully extinguished. "It [Indian title] being a
legal right, it could not thereafter be extinguished except by surrender to the
65 Id. at 375 (S.C.R.) 197 (D.L.R.).
661d. at 394 (S.C.R.); 202 (D.L.R.).
6

7Id. at 395 (S.C.R.); 203 (D.L.R.).
R. v. White and Bob (1965), 50 D.L.R. (2d) 613; 52 W.W.R. 193 (B.C.C.A.).
69 Id. at 636 (D.L.R.); 218 (W.W.R.).
70 Calder, supra, note 56 at 397 (S.C.R.); 205 (D.L.R.).
71
Id. at 400-01 (S.C.R.); 207-08 (D.L.R.).
72Id. at 401 (S.C.R.); 208 (D.L.R.).
68
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Crown or by competent legislative authority, and then only by specific legislation." 73 Hall J.looked for clear and plain legislation confirming extinguishment and could find none. "There is no such proof in the case at bar; no
legislation to that effect." 74 More than inferences from past Acts were required to establish de jure extinguishment; the Privy Council precedents made
that clear. In effect, the Attorney-General of British Columbia was asking
the Court to demand that the Nishga Indians prove that their title was not
extinguished by the Crown. In Hall J.'s view this was backwards: the "onus
of proving" rested on the respondent.
The Attorney-General of British Columbia based his case on the actions
of Governors Douglas and Seymour and the Council of British Columbia.
Calder and his associates argued that neither Douglas, Seymour nor the
Council of the Colony of British Columbia had had the authority to extinguish Indian title. After reviewing the relevant Commissions, enactments, and
ordinances presented on behalf of the respondent, Hall agreed with Calder's
submission. He concluded:
If in any of the Proclamations or actions of Douglas, Seymour or of the Council
of the Colony of British Columbia there are elements which the respondent says
extinguish by implication the Indian title, then it is obvious from the Commission
of the Governor and from the Instructions under which the Governor was required to observe and neither the Commission nor the Instructions contain any
power or authorization to extinguish the Indian title, then it follows logically that
if any attempt was made to extinguish the title it was beyond the power of the
Governor or of the Council to do so and, therefore, ultra vires.7 5

Justice Hall's dissenting judgment in the Calder case ranks higher than
his dissent in Truscott. The historical details are meticulously researched and
the argument is lucidly presented. This opinion was one of the last Hall wrote
as a Justice of the Supreme Court. He deeply regretted that it was not a
majority judment, since he could think of no better way to end his career as
a judge than to see a long-standing injustice to native peoples corrected.
F.

CONCLUSION

Since March, 1973, Emmett Hall has been living in 'retirement' with his
wife in Saskatoon. 'Retirement' is in quotation marks because, in the conventional understanding of the term, Emmett Hall is hardly in retirement. But
then he never was a conventional man. Since leaving the Supreme Court of
Canada, he has been busily engaged in studying the judicial structure of
Saskatchewan and arbitrating labour disputes. In 1974, he prepared a report
on railway arbitration and, in 1975, he submitted a proposal for restructuring
the Saskatchewan family court system.
Hall has just completed a Royal Commission study on the network of
railway lines in Saskatchewan. This study70 surveyed the potential social and
71d. at 402 (S.C.R.); 208 (D.L.R.).
741d. at 404 (S.C.R.); 210 (D.L.R.).
75Id. at 413 (S.C.R.); 216-17 (D.L.R.).
76 (Can.) Grain Handlings and Transportation Commission. Grain and Rail in
Western Canada,Vol. 1 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1977).
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economic impact which a reduction in the railway services to remote areas
of Saskatchewan might have on the people and economy of the province. As
one might expect, this was a highly contentious matter, and all the parties
involved - the farmers, the railways, the municipalities, and the public at
large - have been very much interested in it. In preparing the report, Hall
travelled throughout the province conducting public hearings among a wide
range of interested groups and individuals.
Emmett Hall concluded that 2,165 miles of grain-related prairie branch
lines should be abandoned in stages between now and 1981. He also recommended that 1,813 miles of branch lines become part of the basic rail network which would be guaranteed to the year 2000. This was designed to
ensure sufficient transportation for the increased grain, mineral, and timber
production which the Commission foresaw. These proposals outline a practical solution to the problems facing the west, and reaction to them has been
uniformly favourable.
Emmett Hall's friends and family hope that now that this Royal Commission study is completed, the indefatigable worker will finally retire and
rest as he approaches his eightieth year. It is hard to imagine, however, that
Emmett Hall will ever retire in that sense.

